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BRING YOUR DOGMA TO WORK DAY: THE
WORKPLACE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT OF
2007 AND THE PUBLIC WORKPLACE
Gretchen S. Futrell*
INTRODUCTION
The proposed Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2007
("WRFA"),' one incarnation of a bill that has come before Congress
repeatedly for more than a decade,2 would amend Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 in ways that would almost certainly implicate serious
Establishment Clause challenges.3 In particular, the language of the
* Juris Doctor Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2010;
B.A. in History and Religion, Duke University, 2003.
1. H.R. 1431, 110th Cong. (2007).
2. See Protecting American Employees from Workplace Discrimination:
Hearing on H.R. 1431 Before the Subcomm. on Health, Employment, Labor, and
Pensions of the H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 110th Cong. 80 (2007) (prepared
testimony of Michael J. Gray, representing Human Resource Policy Association),
available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 110_house
_hearings&docid=f:40606.pdf [hereinafter Testimony of Michael J. Gray] ("As you
may know, versions of H.R. 1431 have been introduced in Congress a number of
times over the last 14 years. H.R. 4237, 106th Cong. (2000) (House Version); S.
1668, 106th Cong. (1999) (Senate Counterpart); H.R. 2948, 105th Cong. (1997); S.
92, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 1124, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 92, 105th Cong. (1997);
H.R. 4117 104th Cong. (1996); S. 2071 104th Cong. (1996); H.R. 5233 103d Cong.
(1994)."). Mr. Gray's prepared statement for the hearing can also be viewed at
http://edlabor.house.gov/testimony/2008-02-12-MichaelGray.pdf.
3. The text of H.R. 1431, 110th Cong. (2007) in its entirety is as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the 'Workplace Religious Freedom
Act of 2007'.
SEC. 2. AMENDMENTS
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(a) DEFINITIONS-Section 7010) of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e(j)) is amended-
(1) by inserting '(1)' after '(j)';
(2) by inserting ', after initiating and engaging in an
affirmative and bona fide effort,' after 'unable';
(3) by striking 'an employee's' and all that follows through
'religious' and inserting 'an employee's religious'; and
(4) by adding at the end the following:
'(2)(A) In this subsection, the term 'employee' includes an
employee (as defined in subsection (f)), or a prospective
employee, who, with or without reasonable accommodation,
is qualified to perform the essential functions of the
employment position that such individual holds or desires.
'(B) In this paragraph, the term 'perform the essential
functions' includes carrying out the core requirements of an
employment position and does not include carrying out
practices relating to clothing, practices relating to taking time
off, or other practices that may have a temporary or
tangential impact on the ability to perform job functions, if
any of the practices described in this subparagraph restrict
the ability to wear religious clothing, to take time off for a
holy day, or to participate in a religious observance or
practice.
'(3) In this subsection, the term 'undue hardship' means an
accommodation requiring significant difficulty or expense.
For purposes of determining whether an accommodation
requires significant difficulty or expense, factors to be
considered in making the determination shall include-
'(A) the identifiable cost of the accommodation, including
the costs of loss of productivity and of retraining or hiring
employees or transferring employees from I facility to
another;
'(B) the overall financial resources and size of the employer
involved, relative to the number of its employees; and
'(C) for an employer with multiple facilities, the geographic
separateness of administrative or fiscal relationship of the
facilities.'.
(b) EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES-Section 703 of such Act (42
U.S.C. 2000e-2) is amended by adding at the end the
following:
'(o)(1) In this subsection:
'(A) The term 'employee' has the meaning given in
7016)(2).
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WRFA ensures inevitable excessive entanglement of government and
religion in the context of public employers and religious employees. The
Act would accomplish this end by placing a near-absolute, affirmative
burden of accommodation on employers where a workplace conflict
arises due to an employee's faith or beliefs. Its practical effects would
essentially grant every individual employee status as a religious entity
unto him or herself. This is especially problematic for public
employers.4 The favorably heightened status of religious employees
'(B) The term 'leave of general usage' means leave
provided under the policy or program of an employer, under
which-
'(i) an employee may take leave by adjusting or altering the
work schedule or assignment of the employee according to
criteria determined by the employer; and
'(ii) the employee may determine the purpose for which the
leave is to be utilized.
'(2) For purposes of determining whether an employer has
committed an unlawful employment practice under this title
by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation to the
religious observance or practice of an employee, for an
accommodation to be considered to be reasonable, the
accommodation shall remove the conflict between
employment requirements and the religious observance or
practice of the employee.
'(3) An employer shall be considered to commit such a
practice by failing to provide such a reasonable
accommodation for an employee if the employer refuses to
permit the employee to utilize leave of a general usage to
remove such a conflict solely because the leave will be used
to accommodate the religious observance or practice of the
employee.'.
SEC. 3. EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICATION OF AMENDMENTS.
(a) EFFECTIVE DATE-Except as provided in subsection (b),
this Act and the amendments made by section 2 take effect
on the date of enactment of this Act.
(b) APPLICATION OF AMENDMENTS-The amendments made
by section 2 do not apply with respect to conduct occurring
before the date of enactment of this Act.
4. In its revised Guideline Manual on Religious Discrimination in the
Workplace, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") has
recognized the tension between the constitutional duties of public employers and the
constitutional rights of public employees, noting that while "a government employer
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under the WRFA necessarily involves highly subjective standards of
personal faith. If enacted it would lead to impermissible inquiry by
public employers and eventually by courts as to what constitutes
statutorily "valid" religious expression and what does not.5 Courts have
long resisted these kinds of probative assessments, as evidenced by the
so-called "ministerial exception" to Title VII. 6 Moreover, the WRFA
may contend that granting a requested religious accommodation would pose an
undue hardship because it would constitute government endorsement of religion in
violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment," "government
employees' religious expression is protected by both the First Amendment and Title
VII." EEOC Directives Transmittal No. 915.003 at 4 & n.l1 (issued 7/22/08),
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/religion.pdf (covering the issuance of
§ 12 of the new Compliance Manual on "Religious Discrimination," providing
"guidance and instructions for investigating and analyzing charges alleging
discrimination based on religion").
5. The current statutory definition of religion "includes all aspects of religious
observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employee demonstrates that he
is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's
religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the
employer's business." 42 U.S.C. 2000e(j) (2006). The EEOC advises that:
[b]ecause the definition of religion is broad and protects
beliefs with which the employer may be unfamiliar, the
employer should ordinarily assume that an employee's
request for religious accommodation is based on a sincerely-
held religious belief. If, however, an employee requests
religious accommodation, and an employer has an objective
basis for questioning either the religious nature or the
sincerity of a particular belief or practice, the employer
would be justified in seeking additional supporting
information.
EEOC Directives Transmittal No. 915.003, supra note 4, at 14.
6. The "ministerial exception" is an internal affairs doctrine that holds that
courts will generally decline review of church actions or decisions because doing so
would require impermissible judicial inquiry into ecclesiastical matters. It maintains
that secular authorities' involvement in evaluating or interpreting religious doctrine
impinges on practitioners' rights under the Religion Clauses, and leads to excessive
entanglement in violation of the Establishment Clause. In the employment context,
the ministerial exception recognizes that an employee's relationship to his or her
employer may be "so pervasively religious" that judicial interference based on a
Title VII claim becomes impossible without offending the Establishment Clause.
DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166, 172 (2d Cir. 1993) (See generally
Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2008) (affirming the vitality of the
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would promote the kind of continuing state surveillance repudiated in
Lemon v. Kurtzman7 by requiring public employers to constantly monitor
and undertake (potentially drastic) measures in accommodating religious
employees - to the likely disadvantage of co-workers and the public at
large.
PART I. THE LEMON LEGACY
It was in the landmark Lemon decision that the United States
Supreme Court set forth a three-part test to be applied in evaluating
Establishment Clause 8 challenges. That test has proven to be anything
but bright-line.9 Still, even Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Lemon
ministerial exception to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964)); see also EEOC
Directives Transmittal No. 915.003, supra note 4, at 19-20.
7. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
8. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the fight of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
9. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60 (1985) (striking down an Alabama
statute authorizing voluntary silent prayer in public schools on grounds that the
legislature's "sole purpose [for passing the statute was] expressing the State's
endorsement of prayer activities for one minute at the beginning of each schoolday
[sic]. The addition of 'or voluntary prayer' indicates that the State intended to
characterize prayer as a favored practice. Such an endorsement is not consistent
with the established principle that the government must pursue a course of complete
neutrality toward religion." In a protracted dissenting opinion, however, Justice
Rehnquist called the notion of a rigid wall between church and state a "misleading
metaphor" upon which "the Establishment Clause [had] been expressly freighted...
for nearly 40 years." Id. at 92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Rehnquist went on to note
that "[o]ne of the difficulties with the entanglement prong is that, when divorced
from the logic of Walz [Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding state
property tax exemptions to church property used in worship on grounds of historical
acceptance)], it creates an 'insoluble paradox' in school aid cases: we have required
aid to parochial schools to be closely watched lest it be put to sectarian use, yet this
close supervision itself will create an entanglement (quoting Roemer v. Md. Bd. of
Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 768-69 (1976) (White, J., concurring))." Id. at 109
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Further, Rehnquist opined that
[T]he entanglement test . . . also ignores the myriad state
administrative regulations properly placed upon sectarian
institutions such as curriculum, attendance, and certification
378 FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7
Court, acknowledged the elusive nature of this "extraordinarily sensitive
area of constitutional law": 10
The language of the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment is at best opaque, particularly when
requirements for sectarian schools, or fire and safety
regulations for churches. Avoiding entanglement between
church and State may be an important consideration in a case
like Walz, but if the entanglement prong were applied to all
state and church relations in the automatic manner in which
it has been applied to school aid cases, the State could hardly
require anything of church-related institutions as a condition
for receipt of financial assistance. These difficulties arise
because the Lemon test has no more grounding in the history
of the First Amendment than does the wall theory upon
which it rests. The three-part test represents a determined
effort to craft a workable rule from a historically faulty
doctrine; but the rule can only be as sound as the doctrine it
attempts to service. The three-part test has simply not
provided adequate standards for deciding Establishment
Clause cases, as this Court has slowly come to realize. Even
worse, the Lemon test has caused this Court to fracture into
unworkable plurality opinions... depending upon how each
of the three factors applies to a certain state action. The
results from our school services cases show the difficulty we
have encountered in making the Lemon test yield principled
results.
Id. at 110 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). He concluded,
[N]otwithstanding the absence of a historical basis for this
theory of rigid separation, the wall idea might well have
served as a useful albeit misguided analytical concept, had it
led this Court to unified and principled results in
Establishment Clause cases. The opposite, unfortunately,
has been true; in the 38 years since Everson our
Establishment Clause cases have been neither principled nor
unified. Our recent opinions, many of them hopelessly
divided pluralities, have with embarrassing candor conceded
that the 'wall of separation' is merely a 'blurred, indistinct,
and variable barrier,' which 'is not wholly accurate' and can
only be 'dimly perceived.'
Id. at 106-107 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. 602, 614
(1971); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677-78 (1971); Wolman v. Walter, 433
U.S. 229, 236 (1977); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984)).
10. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
compared with other portions of the Amendment.
Its authors did not simply prohibit the establishment
of a state church or a state religion, an area history
shows they regarded as very important and fraught
with great dangers. Instead they commanded that
there should be 'no law respecting an establishment
of religion.' A law may be one 'respecting' the
forbidden objective while falling short of its total
realization. A law 'respecting' the proscribed result,
that is, the establishment of religion, is not always
easily identifiable as one violative of the Clause. A
given law might not establish a state religion but
nevertheless be one 'respecting' that end in the sense
of being a step that could lead to such establishment
and hence offend the First Amendment."
Despite, or perhaps owing to, such uncertainty, Lemon drew
upon a number of threads in case law precedent12 to identify three
"cumulative criteria" of Establishment Clause comportment. 13 Applying
this test, the Lemon Court invalidated Rhode Island and Pennsylvania
11. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I. ) (emphasis omitted).
12. See generally Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (holding that tax
exemptions for religious institutions were not facially invalid and did not advance or
inhibit religion as long as the exemptions were applied neutrally, i.e., also granted to
other non-profit charitable or educational, quasi-public organizations); Bd. of Educ.
of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (upholding a government
loan program of secular textbooks to students attending religious and other private
schools because the program had a secular purpose of promoting education and it
was the students, not the religious or private institutions, that received the
governmentally subsidized benefit); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963) (holding that a Pennsylvania statute compelling public
schoolchildren to read from the Bible and recite the Lord's Prayer each morning
violated the Establishment Clause because the children were required by law to
attend school).
13. Thus, per Lemon, a statute will withstand Establishment Clause challenge
only if "first, [it is found to] have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal
or primary effect [is] one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and finally, [it
does] not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion. Lemon, 403
U.S. at 612-13 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 674).
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statutes that made supplemental state funding available to private,
religiously affiliated elementary and secondary schools.
4
Ultimately, the outcome in Lemon turned upon the Court's
determination that the statutes created an unconstitutionally excessive
entanglement between government and religion. In its discussion, the
Court noted that while "[j]udicial caveats against entanglement must
recognize that the line of separation, far from being a 'wall,' is a blurred,
indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a
particular relationship, 15 this did not preclude judicial uniformity
altogether. Rather, courts "must examine the character and purposes of
the institutions that are benefitted, the nature of the aid that the State
provides, and the resulting relationship between the government and the
religious authority."'
16
Chief Justice Burger identified a number of problems that
rendered the two statutes at issue constitutionally void.' 7 For instance,
both statutes required strict separation of secular and non-secular
educational instruction and purported to fund only those with no
religious content.1 8  Notwithstanding genuine legislative intent to
supplement secular education in nonpublic schools, this statutory scheme
was not constitutionally viable. Firstly, the Lemon Court "recognize[d]
that a dedicated religious person ...will inevitably experience great
difficulty in remaining religiously neutral. Doctrines and faith are not
inculcated or advanced by neutrals."' 9 Justice Burger stressed that the
mere "potential for impermissible fostering of religion ''2° ran afoul of
14. Id. at 624-25.
15. Id. at 614.
16. Id. at 615.
17. Id. at 615-24.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 618.
20. Id. at 619. See also Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756, 778 (1973) (making an analogous argument, in the school aid context,
that:
a mere statistical judgment will not suffice as a guarantee
that state funds will not be used to finance religious
education. In Earley v. DiCenso, a companion case to Lemon
v. Kurtzman, the Court struck down a Rhode Island law
authorizing salary supplements to teachers of secular
subjects. The grants were not to exceed 15% of any teacher's
380 FIRST AMENDMENT LA W RE VIEW [Vol. 7
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Establishment Clause mandates. The Court also noted that "unlike a
book, a teacher cannot be inspected once so as to determine the extent
and intent of his or her personal beliefs and subjective acceptance of the
limitations imposed by the First Amendment." 2' Additionally, the
statutes required extensive state monitoring of school records, which the
Court found only bolstered entanglement by forcing governmental bodies
to make judgments differentiating schools' secular versus sectarian
22
expenses. Finally, Chief Justice Burger pointed to the statutes'
"divisive political potential" as fostering a "broader base of
23
entanglement" between religious and governmental entities.
In summary, the state aid provided to sectarian schools in Rhode
Island and Pennsylvania violated the Establishment Clause because it
created excessive entanglement in three particular ways: it placed
teachers of faith in the precarious position of differentiating between
religious and secular instruction, which not only unfairly burdened
individual teachers but also involved impossibly subjective standards of
evaluation; it implicated "pervasive monitoring" of church organizations
annual salary. Although the law was invalidated on
entanglement grounds, the Court made clear that the State
could not have avoided violating the Establishment
Clause by merely assuming that its teachers would succeed
in segregating 'their religious beliefs from their secular
educational responsibilities.'
(quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619).
21. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619.
22. Chief Justice Burger concluded,
This kind of state inspection and evaluation of the religious
content of a religious organization is fraught with the sort of
entanglement that the Constitution forbids. It is a
relationship pregnant with dangers of excessive government
direction ... [and] the very restrictions and surveillance
necessary to ensure that teachers play a strictly
nonideological [sic] role give rise to entanglements between
church and state .... [T]he government's post-audit power
to inspect and evaluate ... which expenditures are religious
and which are secular creates an intimate and continuing
relationship between church and state.
Id. at 620-22.
23. Id. at 622.
2009]
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by secular authorities;24 and it ensured divisive political conflict along
religious lines since taxpayers of any number of faiths (or no faith at all)
ultimately bore the costs of the programs. 25 Although it has since been
subsumed under the primary effects inquiry, Lemon's excessive
entanglement criterion has remained informative in Establishment Clause
jurisprudence.26 Each concern mentioned above arises by analogy at the
cross-section of employment and religion and is, as this article argues,
equally constitutionally suspect.
PART II. THE GENESIS OF REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND THE
UNDUE HARDSHIP STANDARD
A. The Civil Rights Act of 1964
As originally enacted, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
barred employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.27 It has been suggested that the arguably
voluntary nature of religious observance renders its 1964 inclusion-
among otherwise immutable characteristics like race or gender-
28somewhat anomalous. Michael Moberly has argued that employees
asserting religious discrimination under Title VII actually receive more
favorable treatment than the other protected classes because while the
24. Id. at 627 (Douglas, J., concurring).
25. In Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997), entanglement became part of
the Lemon effects test and the political divisiveness aspect of entanglement was
eliminated. FRANK S. RAVITCH, LAW AND RELIGION, A READER: CASES, CONCEPTS
AND THEORY 326 (2004).
26. "Notwithstanding its 'checkered career,' Lemon ... continues to set forth
the applicable constitutional standard for assessing the validity of governmental
actions challenged under the Establishment Clause." Vasquez v. L.A. County, 487
F.3d 1246, 1254 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 711 (2007) (citing Santa Fe
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 319 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)); see
also Newman v. City of East Point, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1374, 1378 (N.D. Ga. 2002)
(noting that the Lemon three-part test "remains, with one notable exception, the
controlling standard for Establishment Clause jurisprudence.").
27. 42 U.S.C. §703(a)(1) (2004).
28. James A. Sonne, The Perils of Universal Accommodation: The Workplace
Religious Freedom Act of 2003 and the Affirmative Action of 147,096,000 Souls, 79
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1023, 1029 (2004).
382 [Vol. 7
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Act prohibits religious discrimination to an extent comparable to that for
racial and other types of discrimination, it goes one step further by
placing an affirmative obligation on employers to accommodate their
religious beliefs and practices. 29 The 1964 Act did not define "religion"
for its purposes3 ° and made no mention of an employer's duty to
"reasonably accommodate" employee religious practices.
This latter concept appeared in promulgations issued by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) shortly after the
311964 enactment. In 1966 the EEOC issued guidelines establishing an
employer duty to reasonably accommodate employees' religious
practices where the accommodation did not involve "serious
32inconvenience" to the employer. Just one year later, in 1967, the
EEOC replaced the "serious inconvenience" standard to exempt an
employer from reasonable accommodation only where the employer
could show "undue hardship. ' 33  These elements of "reasonable
accommodation" absent "undue hardship" were incorporated into Title
VII by way of a 1972 amendment.34
While "undue hardship" remains a determinant criterion in
employer accommodation, that phrase has yet to be statutorily defined -
a primary aim of the WRFA.35 Though the statutory language may be
29. Michael D. Moberly, Bad News for Those Proclaiming the Good News?:
The Employer's Ambiguous Duty to Accommodate Religious Proselytizing, 42
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2001).
30. See Robert A. Caplen, A Struggle of Biblical Proportions: The Campaign
to Enact the Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2003, 16 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 579, 583 (2005).
31. Gregory J. Gawlik, The Politics of Religion: "Reasonable
Accommodations" and the Establishment Clause-An Analysis of the Workplace
Religious Freedom Act, 47 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 249, 251 (1999).
32. Id. at 252 (citing Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion, 29
C.F.R. § 1605.1(a)(2) (1966)).
33. Id. (citing Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion, 29 C.F.R. §
1605.1 (a)(2) (1967)).
34. Id. (noting that in at least two cases between 1967-72, courts questioned
the EEOC's authority to place the burden of proving "undue hardship" upon
employers).
35. See Gregory M. Baxter, Employers Beware: The Workplace Religious
Freedom Act of 2000 2 RUTGERS J. OF L. & RELIG. 6, 1 n.2 (2001) (quoting the 1999
comments of Senator John Kerry (D-MA) when he introduced a WRFA 2007
predecessor, S. 1668. Addressing the phrase "undue hardship," Senator Kerry
383
ambiguous, a robust body of case law has developed in which federal
courts have shied away from absolutes in determining whether an
employer has met the requisite reasonable accommodation standard,
opting instead for more balanced totality-of-the-circumstances
approaches. 36 The WRFA proposes to dramatically circumscribe both
well-developed principles of workplace religious expression: reasonable
accommodation by employers and the standard of undue hardship they
must demonstrate. The ramifications are especially questionable in the
context of public employers, yet the WRFA does not address any
distinction between the public and private job sectors.
B. The Supreme Court Speaks: Hardison and Ansonia
The first case to come before the Supreme Court involving an
employee challenge on the grounds of religious reasonable
accommodation under Title VII was Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Hardison.37 The significance of Hardison, as the seminal authority for
determining the extent of an employer's § 2000e(j) obligation to
reasonably accommodate employees' religious practices or beliefs, is
difficult to overstate. Hardison was an airline employee whose religious
beliefs prohibited him from working from sunset on Friday until sunset
remarked "it ha[d] been interpreted so narrowly as to place little restraint on an
employer's refusal to provide religious accommodation. The Workplace Religious
Freedom Act will restore to the religious accommodation provision the weight that
Congress originally intended and help assure that employers have a meaningful
obligation to reasonably accommodate their employee's religious practices."). In
fact, James Sonne has noted that "the scant record of legislative history on the [ 1972
amendment to Title VII, which expanded the statutory definition of 'religion' and
incorporated the language of 'reasonable accommodation' absent 'undue hardship']
yielded significant uncertainty as to its exact meaning, a fate seemingly shared by
the inclusion of religion in the 1964 Act in the first place." Sonne, supra note 28, at
1040.
36. See Gawlik, supra note 31, at 264 ("[T]he accommodation of 'mutual'
compromise-one not always requiring complete conflict removal to the extent that
the employee is burden-free-is the concept that the [Supreme] Court prefers."
(internal footnotes omitted)).
37. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
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on Saturday, and on certain religious holidays.38 Hardison informed his
department manager of these religious observances, and Hardison was
transferred to a more compatible shift. Soon after that transfer Hardison
bid for and received a transfer from one operations building to another.
The new building, however, had entirely distinct seniority rankings and
Hardison was placed at the low end.39 Ultimately, no accommodation
was made; Hardison refused to work on Saturdays, and he was
discharged for insubordination.4 0 Hardison brought suit in U.S. district
court seeking injunctive relief against Trans World Airlines (TWA) on
the basis of religious discrimination under Title VII. Although the lower
court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed on constitutional• 41
questions, the district court held that TWA had properly met its duties. 42
of reasonable accommodation while the Eighth Circuit reversed the
judgment for TWA.43
38. Hardison was hired by TWA on June 5, 1967, as a clerk in TWA's Kansas
City Stores Department. He began studying the teachings of the Worldwide Church
of God during the spring of 1968, subsequent to his hiring. Id. at 66-67.
39. Id. at 68. Because all TWA employees were bound by a union collective-
bargaining agreement, they were subject to a seniority system that allowed more
senior workers priority of choice for, inter alia, job and shift assignments. Hardison
had more senior standing at his prior building, which enabled him to observe the
Sabbath. Although "TWA agreed to permit the union to seek a change of work
assignments for Hardison," the union was unwilling "to violate the seniority
provisions set out in the collective-bargaining contract, and Hardison had
insufficient seniority to bid for a shift having Saturdays off." Id. at 67.
40. Id. at 69. TWA rejected a proposed arrangement under which Hardison
would work four days per week. The Court noted a number of reasons why it was
critical to TWA's business operation that Hardison work the weekend shifts:
"Hardison's job was essential, and on weekends he was the only available person on
his shift to perform it. To leave the position empty would have impaired supply shop
functions, which were critical to airline operations; to fill Hardison's position with a
supervisor or an employee from another area would simply have undermanned
another operation; and to employ someone not regularly assigned to work Saturdays
would have required TWA to pay premium wages." Id. at 68-69.
41. The District Court rejected outright TWA's argument that "requiring it in
any way to accommodate the religious needs of its employees would constitute an
unconstitutional establishment of religion." Id. at 70.
42. Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. 375 F. Supp. 877, 889 (W.D. Mo.
1974).
43. Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975).
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The Supreme Court disagreed and reversed the appellate
decision. Writing for the Court, Justice White acknowledged the scant
legislative history and dearth of case precedent indicating, respectively,
any congressional intent or judicial interpretation regarding the 1972
amendment requiring reasonable accommodation short of undue
hardship. 4 Justice White noted that in order to accommodate Hardison's
religious practices to the extent Hardison sought, TWA would have had
to unilaterally breach the seniority provisions of its contractual
collective-bargaining agreement with the union, thereby abrogating the
seniority rights of other employees for Hardison's sole advantage.45 The
Court noted that in negotiating an agreement to govern the allocation of
weekend shifts, TWA and the union had few options to accomplish this
neutrally. The seniority system was preferable, wrote Justice White,
because allocating those shift in accordance with employees' religious
needs would have ensured Hardison the necessary days off "only at the
expense of others who had strong, but perhaps nonreligious, reasons for
44. For example, Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir.
1970), was not informative even when considered in tandem with the 1972
amendment to § 7010) that followed. In Dewey, an equally divided Sixth Circuit
held that where an employee was fired after refusing to work on Sunday for religious
reasons, the discharge was not unlawful because the manner in which the employer
allocated Sunday work assignments was not discriminatory in either its purpose or
effect, and the employer had met the reasonable accommodation requirement (then
only embodied in the 1967 EEOC guidelines) by offering the employee the chance
to find a substitute for his Sunday work. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 73. In response to
Dewey, Congress enacted the 1972 amendment to incorporate the EEOC guidelines,
but the Hardison Court pointed out that in doing so, "Congress did not indicate that
'reasonable accommodation' requires an employer to do more than was done in
Dewey, apparently preferring to leave that question open for future resolution by the
EEOC." Id. at 75 n.10.
45. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 79. Justice White concluded that, absent "a clear and
express indication from Congress, we cannot agree with Hardison and the EEOC
that an agreed-upon seniority system must give way when necessary to
accommodate religious observances." Id. See also Debbie N. Kaminer, Title VII's
Failure to Provide Meaningful and Consistent Protection of Religious Employees:
Proposals for an Amendment, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 575, 588 (2000) ("The
Hardison Court's hesitance to require differential treatment of Hardison can be
understood in the context of the courts' general reluctance to require much more
than neutrality in interpreting Title VII.").
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not working on weekends. ' 46 Such resultant "unequal treatment", the
Court concluded, was not contemplated under Title VII:
[It] would be anomalous to conclude that by
"reasonable accommodation" Congress meant that
an employer must deny the shift and job preference
of some employees, as well as deprive them of their
contractual rights, in order to accommodate or prefer
the religious needs of others, and we conclude that
Title VII does not require an employer to go that
far.
47
The Hardison Court therefore held that anything more than a de
minimus cost upon an employer, in efforts to reasonably accommodate
religious employees' practices or beliefs, would suffice to show undue
48hardship. In the absence of express statutory language to the contrary,
the Court continued, the statute was not to be construed as "[requiring]
an employer to discriminate against some employees in order to enable
others to observe their Sabbath.,
49
In Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook, the only other
Title VII "reasonable accommodation" case to come before the Supreme
Court, the Court further narrowed its Hardison decision by holding that
an employer need not demonstrate that more than one alternative means
of reasonable accommodation proposed by a religious employee would
result in undue hardship: "We find no basis in either the statute or its
legislative history for requiring an employer to choose any particular
reasonable accommodation . . . . [W]here the employer has already
46. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 81.
47. Id. In Hardison, "it was coincidental that... the seniority system acted to
compound his problems in exercising his religion." Id. at 82.
48. Id. at 84. In an attempt to limit Hardison, the EEOC issued revised
guidelines in 1980, which included, inter alia, a per se rule that a "mere assumption"
that more than one religious employee would require similar religious
accommodation was not sufficient to establish undue hardship. Further, the 1980
guidelines stated that if multiple means of accommodation were. available to an
employer, the employer had an affirmative obligation to offer the alternative least
disadvantageous to the employee. Caplen, supra note 30, at 595.
49. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 85.
50. 479 U.S. 60 (1986).
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reasonably accommodated the employee's religious needs, the statutory
inquiry is at an end."'"
The Court emphasized that "'bilateral cooperation is appropriate
in the search for an acceptable reconciliation of the needs of the
employee's religion and the exigencies of the employer's business.
' '52
Otherwise, opined the Ansonia Court, employees would have every
reason "to hold out for the most beneficial accommodation, despite the
fact that an employer offers a reasonable resolution of the conflict.,
53
PARTII. A Fork in the Road: the Workplace Religious Freedom Act of
2007
The WRFA proposes a radical departure from the principles of
Hardison and Ansonia,54 as well as from the substantial body of case law
that has developed in their wake. This note is concerned with the
ramifications of the Act for public employers in particular, and concludes
that if enacted, the WRFA would inevitably engender the kind of
excessive entanglement of government and religion, first identified in
Lemon as antithetical to First Amendment mandates, and which courts
continue to reject unequivocally. Specifically, the WRFA requirement
that "for an accommodation to be considered reasonable, [it] shall
remove the conflict between the employment requirements and the
religious observances or practice of the employee" is irreconcilable with
the practical reality that, simply put, this may not always be possible.
55
51. Id. at 68.
52. Id. at 69 (quoting Brener v. Diagnostic Center Hospital, 671 F.2d. 141,
145-46 (5th Cir. 1982)).
53. Id.
54. Respectively, the de minimus threshold an employer must meet to establish
undue hardship; and the notion that an employer must demonstrate only one
reasonable accommodation in doing so.
55. Gregory Gawlik has argued the WRFA's stipulation that an employer's
duty of reasonable accommodation must remove the conflict altogether
unconstitutionally distorts the word "accommodation" and transmutes "reasonable"
into the kind of absolutism forbidden by Lemon. Further, he contends the WRFA
would enable religious employees to "unilaterally designate which accommodation
the employer will implement", thereby overruling Ansonia and stripping employers
of their discretion in offering a means of accommodation that incorporates
employers' legitimate interests. See Gawlik, supra note 31, at 260, 263-66.
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This is especially true in the context of public employers who
provide governmentally subsidized services. In combination with the
WRFA's imposition upon employers of an affirmative duty of near-
absolute accommodation, the Act could require that employers accept as
legitimate (and, in turn, accommodate) any subjective definition of
"sincere religious belief' that an individual employee may assert, even
16where that employee provides public services. The language lends
itself to "an almost limitless definition of religion" that could differ for4 C, , 17
"virtually every member of the workforce. Essentially, the WRFA
could render every employee the constructive equivalent of a religious
institution unto him- or herself.5s In one clause, the WRFA stipulates
that an employee's ability to "perform the essential functions" of
employment, which the Act defines as "carrying out the core
requirements of an employment position," does not involve "carrying out
practices relating to clothing, practices relating to taking time off, or
other practices that may have a temporary or tangential impact on the
ability to perform job functions." 59 The hopelessly ambiguous notion of
"a temporary or tangential impact on the ability to perform job
56. "Conduct conforming to and motivated by one's religious beliefs is not
always immune from governmental regulation: '[A] determination of what is a
'religious' belief or practice entitled to constitutional protection may present a most
delicate question, [but] the very concept of ordered liberty precludes allowing every
person to make his own standards on matters of conduct in which society as a whole
has important interests."' Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, 775 P.2d 766
(Okla. 1989) (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-216 (1972) and
removing emphasis); see also Testimony of Michael J. Gray, supra note 2, at 3-4
("Courts though remain reluctant to inquire into whether a certain belief or practice
is, in fact, 'religious.' Most courts limit their analysis to whether the belief is
'sincerely held' by the employee. And other courts avoid even that admittedly
'thorny issue' when circumstances permit. In the workplace, however, employers
may not simply dodge the issue. Instead, they must evaluate the particular facts and
circumstances and decide whether to accommodate requests, which may be
controversial. Accordingly, it is imperative that employers be permitted flexibility
to carry out this important mission and not be burdened with impractical blanket
restrictions like those mandated under WRFA." (internal citations omitted)).
57. Sonne, supra note 28 at 1024.
58. See supra note 6 (defining "ministerial exception").
59. H.R. 1431, 110th Cong. § 2(a)(2)(B) (1st Sess. 2007).
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functions" is regressive rather than clarifying. It also assumes its own
uniform applicability across all types of employment, failing to take into
account the range of methods and demands in different lines of work.
That is, accommodating employees' religious practices will likely be
more feasible or more difficult depending upon the specific religious
practices or beliefs in contention, the particular workplace setting, and
the nature of the work to be performed.61
Notwithstanding the fact that the WRFA version of "reasonable
accommodation" flies in the face of well-articulated case law spanning
U.S. court decisions involving public and private employers alike,62 its
proposed scheme is particularly unworkable in the realm of public
employment. Its enforcement in this setting would require constant
monitoring by governmental authorities to ensure public employers'
compliance-just the type of "intimate and continuing relationship
between church and state" repudiated in Lemon.6 3  The Act's vague
60. "WRFA presumes that practices relating to clothing, taking time off, 'or
other practices that may have a temporary or tangential impact on the ability to
perform job functions' cannot be 'essential.' Even though an employer may be
obligated to modify a job requirement for religion there is no clarity for employers
seeking to comply with WRFA on how to do so. This is particularly necessary given
the highly subjective nature of religion beliefs and practices." Testimony of Michael
J. Gray, supra note 2, at 7.
61. "Religion does not exist in a vacuum in the workplace. Rather, it coexists,
both with intensely secular arrangements such as collective bargaining agreements
and with the intensely secular pressures of the marketplace. Hence the import of the
statutory term 'accommodate.' The provision's use of the terms 'reasonably' and
'undue hardship' likewise indicates that this is a field of degrees, not a matter for
extremes. Both terms are 'variable ones,' dependent on the extent of the employee's
religious obligations and the nature of the employer's work requirements." EEOC v.
Firestone Fibers & Textiles Co., 515 F.3d 307, 313 (2008) (citing EEOC v. Ithaca
Indus., Inc., 849 F.2d 116, 120 (4th Cir. 1988)). See also Testimony of Michael J.
Gray, supra note 2, at 7 ("Whereas accommodations under the ADA [a model for the
proposed WRFA] generally involve architectural alterations or equipment purchases
with identifiable costs, accommodations for religious practices have consequences
that often cannot be so easily quantified .... WRFA's 'undue hardship' standard
does not contemplate this inability to weigh such pertinent factors and employers
will face inevitable confusion in trying to apply the standard.").
62. See EEOC Directives Transmittal No. 915.003, supra note 4, at 9 n.29; see
also Testimony of Michael J. Gray, supra note 2, at nn. 7-8.
63. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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language, which only further obfuscates any statutory meaning of
"religious practice or belief," would require ongoing governmental
inquiry into and assessment of employees' religious lives and the
difficult decisions public employers must make in balancing employees'
rights to religious expression with the interests of the public whom those
employees serve. Courts have emphasized the inherent need for
balancing tests and public employer discretion depending on the specific
circumstances in which an employee's religious expression has interfered
with the provision of religiously neutral public services. 64 The absolutist
nature of "reasonable accommodation" under the WRFA would demand
governmental concessions for religious public employees-most likely at
the expense of fellow employees', as well as public clientele, rights-in
ways that would unconstitutionally blur the lines of church-state
• 65
separation.
64. See infra note 97; infra note 100. See also Testimony of Michael J. Gray,
supra note 2, at 5 ("The body of recent Title VII case law indicates that courts, when
faced with religious accommodation questions, weigh the rights of the individual
against those of fellow employees and third parties .... [W]hen faced with more
difficult scenarios that require consideration of more significant impact on fellow
employees or the overall business, courts demonstrate appropriate reluctance to
create disturbances in the workplace and analyze the competing factors in reaching a
decision .... [C]ourts [use] the flexibility of the current standard to evaluate the
employee's right to perform religious acts within the overall objective of
maintaining a discrimination-free workplace."). See also Gawlik, supra note 31, at
264 ("the accommodation of 'mutual' compromise--one not always requiring
complete conflict removal to the extent that the employee is burden-free-is the
concept that the [Supreme] Court prefers.").
65. See Gawlik, supra note 31, at 263-64 ("The more non-negotiable orders
that an amendment like WRFA is seen to give employers in the name of religion, the
more Title VII gets pushed toward an 'absolute' burden-a constitutionally
unacceptable degree." (Emphasis in original)); see also Testimony of Professor
Helen Norton before the Subcommittee on Health, Employment, Labor, and
Pensions of the U.S. House of Representatives' Committee on Education and Labor,
Feb. 12, 2008, at 3 (Text available at http://edlabor.house.gov/testimony/2008-02-
12-HelenNorton.pdf) [hereinafter Testimony of Professor Helen Norton] ("These are
very difficult cases because they involve direct clashes between interests that are
protected by Title VII and other constitutional and legal rights .... To be sure, the
plaintiffs' religious beliefs in these cases are no less sincere and deeply felt than
those in any others. These cases are different because of the requested
accommodations' effect on third parties' civil rights, religious liberties ... and other
important health care needs.").
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These possibilities are perhaps best illustrated by a number of
recent66 state and federal court decisions involving employee claims
against their public (or government-affiliated) employers on grounds of
Title VII religious accommodation in the workplace. In considering how
the following cases may have come out differently under the WRFA, it
becomes apparent the Act is fraught with constitutional inconsistencies.
PART IV. PUBLIC EMPLOYERS AND REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION
UNDER CURRENT LAW AND POSSIBLE WRFA RAMIFICATIONS
A. The Guidelines on Religious Exercise and Religious Expression in the
Federal Workplace
In August 1997 the Clinton White House released the Guidelines
on Religious Exercise and Religious Expression in the Federal
Workplace in an effort to "address employees' religious exercise and
religious expression when the employees are acting in their personal
capacity within the Federal workplace and the public does not have
regular exposure to the workplace." 68  The Guidelines recognized the
need to counterbalance the First Amendment and Title VII rights of
federal employees with the constitutional constraints by which federal
employers are bound. They provided illustrative examples regarding
religious expression in private work areas; expression among or directed
at fellow employees; expression in areas accessible to the public;
religious discrimination; hostile work environment and harassment
69scenarios; and the accommodation of religious exercise. Still, the
Guidelines acknowledged from the outset they
do not comprehensively address whether and when
the government and its employees may engage in
66. Three of the four cases discussed were decided in or since 2000.
67. Following the decision in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1
(1947), the Establishment Clause was incorporated into the 14th Amendment and
thus made applicable to the states.
68. Guidelines on Religious Exercise and Religious Expression in the Federal
Workplace (Aug. 14, 1997), http://clinton2.nara.gov/WH/New/html/19970819-
3275.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2009).
69. Id.
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religious speech directed at the public .... Although
these Guidelines, including the examples cited in
them, should answer the most frequently
encountered questions in the Federal workplace,
actual cases sometimes will be complicated by
additional facts and circumstances that may require a
different result from the one the Guidelines
indicate.7
The Guidelines affirmed that the Establishment Clause
"prohibits the Government-including its employees-from acting in a
manner that would lead a reasonable observer to conclude that the
Government is sponsoring, endorsing, or inhibiting religion generally or
favoring or disfavoring a particular religion. '' 7' By way of example, they
provided that:
where the public has access to the Federal
workplace, employee religious expression should be
prohibited where the public reasonably would
perceive that the employee is acting in an official,
rather than a private, capacity, or under
circumstances that would lead a reasonable observer
to conclude that the Government is endorsing or
disparaging religion.72
The Guidelines required that all federal employers be sensitive to
avoid the creation of such an impression and emphasized the federal
government's authority to regulate employees' religious speech "where
the employee's interest in that speech is outweighed by the government's
interest in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs.
' 73
Summarily, "[fjederal employees are paid to perform official work, not
to engage in personal religious or ideological campaigns during work
hours. 74  These Guidelines remain applicable to federal employers.
Nevertheless, Stephen Kao has contended that among other
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Establishment Clause as the ultimate standard for evaluating the rights of
federal employees to engage in religious expression and other religious
activities. 75  According to Kao, the Guidelines frustrate the
congressional intent that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act "be the primary
recourse for addressing religious rights in the federal workplace."'76 In
part, Kao argues, "where the Establishment Clause applies to the federal
workplace, the President should have referred to the commonly used
Establishment Clause test introduced by the Supreme Court in Lemon v.
Kurtzman . . . . ",77 Kao also criticizes the Guidelines' omission of any
reference to Title VII "reasonable accommodation."78 Without accepting
or rebutting Kao's observations, it seems fair to conclude that the legal
rights of federal employees, and the legal responsibilities of federal
employers, remain gray areas in the law.
B. Case Studies
1. Spratt v. County of Kent
In an earlier case 79 involving reasonable accommodation under
Title VII § 701(j), plaintiff Robert Spratt filed suit against both his
employer, a county sheriff, and his immediate work supervisor. Spratt, a
Pentecostal Christian, was a county-paid social worker hired to provide
counseling and therapy for prison inmates. 8° Spratt had initially been
placed as a counselor at a juvenile correction facility, but was transferred
to the prison because his "evangelically religious methods of counseling
had alienated many of the youths at the camp." 81  His methods of
counseling included reading from a Bible, prayer, addressing spiritual
issues, and the "casting out of demons." 82 After Spratt's transfer to the
75. Stephen S. Kao, The President's Guidelines on Religious Exercise and
Religious Expression in the Federal Workplace: A Restatement or Reinterpretation
ofLaw?, 8 B.U. PuB. INT. L.J. 251, 255 (1999).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 257-8.
78. Id. at 259-61.
79. Spratt v. County of Kent, 621 F. Supp. 594 (W.D. Mich. 1985).
80. Id. at 596.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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prison, he was advised by the sheriff that his religiously motivated
counseling techniques were inappropriate for a county-paid employee to
perform, and that they should be discontinued. The sheriff maintained a
policy that counselors were not to use religion in their counseling under
any circumstances . Social workers were instructed to refer inmates
with spiritual needs to jail chaplains, provided but not paid by the
84
county.
After receiving inmate complaints that Spratt continued using his
spiritual methods in counseling, and a number of reprimands regarding
Spratt's refusal to comply with county policy, the sheriff terminated
Spratt's employment. At trial Spratt testified that it was not possible to
separate his religious beliefs from his role as counselor.85 On the other
hand, the sheriff testified that though he had considered means of
86accommodating Spratt's religious beliefs, it was simply not possible in
87the plaintiffs case. In moving for summary judgment, among other
arguments, the defendants" asserted they had not violated Title VII
because they had accommodated Spratt's religious beliefs to the extent
possible under the circumstances and in the legitimate pursuit of
maintaining religious neutrality in the county prison. 89 The Michigan
district court agreed:
Sheriff Heffron had very limited flexibility with
which to accommodate plaintiff s religious practices.
The sheriff had an obligation under the
establishment clause of the constitution to maintain a
83. Id. at 598.
84. Id. at 596-97.
85. Id. at 598. But note that plaintiff also testified that his religion did not
"require him to read the Bible or pray with co-workers. He testified further that it
was not inconsistent with his religious beliefs to give non-religious treatment if that
is what the inmate asked for." Id.
86. The sheriff testified that he "did not ask [the] plaintiff to shed his Christian
beliefs.., but he did ask [Spratt] to leave them out of his counseling." Id.
87. Id.
88. A lieutenant sheriff and Spratt's prison supervisor were also named as
individual defendants.
89. In light of such conflicting interests, the sheriff concluded the only solution
was to absolutely prohibit religious counseling. Spratt, 621 F. Supp. at 598.
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policy of neutrality on religious matters.90 ... He
was required to avoid the appearance of favoring one
religion over others or religion over nonreligion ....
Within these narrow straits, the sheriff made what
this Court considers to be reasonable efforts 9I to
accommodate plaintiffs religious practices.92
Kent County was not required to allow Spratt to "speak on
religious issues if that speech violate[d] the establishment clause or the
free exercise rights of inmates." 93  It is worth noting that the court
concluded it was sufficient to forbid plaintiffs use of religious
counseling even where it was only "potentially violative of the
establishment clause." 94  Thus, in Spratt, the lower court found the
sheriffs policy against religious counseling by county employees was
acceptable in light of the mere possibility that "the County could be
accused of violating the establishment clause" where "the individual
bringing the religious message to the inmates was an employee of the
county. 95
If Spratt had been decided under the WRFA, the court's task
may have been far less straightforward. The decision rightfully
recognized that Spratt's supervising sheriff, as a public employer, had
very little leeway in accommodating Spratt's religious practices,
especially to the extent Spratt desired. This was directly attributable to
Establishment Clause obligations. The WRFA seeks myopically to
define terms like "reasonable accommodation," "undue hardship," and
even "employee." Those definitions quickly prove meaningless in the
90. Id. at 600 (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985), Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), Abington Sch. Dist. Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203
(1963)).
91. The Court cited, as evidence of the sheriff's good faith attempts at
reasonable accommodation, that plaintiff was expressly notified of the county policy
prohibiting county social workers from using religious counseling techniques; that
plaintiff was repeatedly warned when it was discovered he continued to practice
spiritual therapy on inmates; that the sheriff sought legal advice to determine
whether it was possible to accommodate plaintiffs religious beliefs; and that
plaintiff was given numerous opportunities to change his verboten tactics. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 601.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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context of public employment. For example, the WRFA purports to
define "perform the essential functions" as
carrying out the core requirements of an
employment position and [not including] ... other
practices that may have a temporary or tangential
impact on the ability to perform job functions, if any
of the [employer] practices described in this
subparagraph restrict the ability.., to participate in
a religious observance or practice.
96
Arguably, this language would afford Spratt a colorable claim:
that his spiritual counseling only impacted his job performance
'temporarily or tangentially.' Spratt testified that when he began therapy
with an inmate, he usually spent the first several sessions gauging the
patient's mental health, and that he only used his religious treatment
approach upon an inmate's request, though he conceded that in some
instances he encouraged inmates to choose that method over other
97treatment options.
The WRFA fails to indicate the meaning of "temporary or
tangential impact on the ability to perform job functions." 98 Beyond the
most obvious examples99 the phrase has almost no meaning in the
context of public employment where, as in Spratt, an employee engages
in repeated, unsolicited, and objectionable or offensive religious
96. H.R. 1431, supra note 1.
97. Spratt, 621 F. Supp. at 596.
98. See H.R. 1431, supra n.l.
99. To be sure, there is no suggestion a public employee would be prohibited
from praying privately without eliciting or disturbing clients or co-workers. This
practice might be described as one having only a 'temporary or tangential' impact on
the ability to otherwise perform job functions. Likewise, it seems evident that for
the most part, religious practices involving wearing certain clothing or hairstyles
have very little impact on an employee's 'core' job performance. These kind of cases
are unlikely to implicate constitutional questions because they do not involve
projection of an employee's religious practices or beliefs onto clients or co-workers
and most likely do not interfere with work productivity; moreover, accommodation
usually comes at no cost to the employer. The case law suggests the courts will find
discrimination on such grounds clearly unreasonable and rule in favor of the
employee. Baxter, supra 35 at paras. 17-27 (concluding the WRFA is unnecessary
since under these kind of circumstances, "courts generally seem to reach the correct
result.").
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expression. As courts have consistently held, there is no 'tangential or
temporary' exception to the Establishment Clause.100 A public employer
has a constitutional duty to anticipate even potential excessive
entanglement, and the mere possibility thereof triggers preemptive
safeguards that may limit incidentally employees' freedom of religious
expression at work. 1  Such restrictions will, of course, be at an
employer's, or perhaps a court's, discretion, and must be meted out based
on the facts and circumstances of a given situation. This calls for a
sensitive balancing of all interests concerned. Contrarily, the WRFA
gives employees a decided advantage, without accounting for the delicate
decision-making that public employers face in juggling employees'
rights, the public interest, and Establishment Clause strictures.1
0 2
2. Rodriguez v. City of Chicago
More than a decade after Spratt, the Seventh Circuit affirmed a
lower court decision granting summary judgment to the city of Chicago
where a police officer sued under Title VII. Plaintiff Rodriguez 1°4
alleged the city had not satisfied its duty to reasonably accommodate his
religious beliefs. In 1993, after a rise in protestor demonstrations outside
abortion clinics, the Chicago Police Department ("CPD") began
assigning officers to guard clinics throughout the city, usually on
Saturday mornings only. 10 5 The purposes of these assignments were to
protect the clinics' property and employees and to maintain the peace.
There were two clinics in Rodriguez's district, and after the CPD
100. "There cannot be the slightest doubt that the First Amendment reflects the
philosophy that Church and State should be separated. And so far as interference
with the 'free exercise' of religion and an 'establishment' of religion are concerned,
the separation must be complete and unequivocal. The First Amendment within the
scope of its coverage permits no exception; the prohibition is absolute." Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952).
101. Cf EEOC Directives Transmittal No. 915.003, supra note 4, at 57 ("An
employer cannot rely on potential or hypothetical hardship when faced with a
religious obligation that conflicts with scheduled work, but rather should rely on
objective information.").
102. See Testimony of Michael J. Gray, supra note 2.
103. Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, 156 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 1998).
104. Id. Appellant before the Seventh Circuit.
105. Id. at 773.
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implemented this procedure, Rodriguez was assigned several shifts
guarding those facilities on a number of occasions. 106  Rodriguez, a
lifelong Roman Catholic, increasingly felt that by guarding the clinics he
was facilitating the abortions performed therein and considered this• • - 107
antithetical to his pro-life religious beliefs.
Rodriguez initially informed his immediate commanding officer
that he objected to clinic duty assignment and was told that while efforts
would be undertaken to accommodate his needs, a formal exemption was
not available.108 Later, Rodriguez wrote to the commanding officer of
his district in an attempt to ensure he would not be assigned clinic
duty. 109 Both Rodriguez's immediate superior officer and the district
commanding officer agreed that while they would attempt to avoid
assigning Rodriguez clinic duty whenever possible, Rodriguez was not at
liberty to refuse such an assignment. 1 Eventually, Rodriguez was
briefly assigned clinic duty as a substitute for a fellow officer, which he
accepted under protest.' 1
In affirming the lower court's ruling for the defendant City, the
Seventh Circuit noted that Rodriguez at all times had the option, pursuant
to a collective bargaining agreement, of transferring-without any
reduction in pay or benefits-to a different district that did not have an
abortion clinic."12 By providing this option, the City had met its duty of
reasonable accommodation. Remaining in the same district was merely
Rodriguez's personal preference," 3 and in declining to exercise that





109. Id. at 773-74.
110. Id. at 774.
111. Id. The EEOC currently provides that "Title VII is violated by an
employer's failure to accommodate even if to avoid adverse consequences an
employee continues to work after his accommodation request is denied." EEOC
Directives Transmittal No. 915.003, supra note 4, at 55.
112. Rodriguez, 156 F.3d at 775.
113. Rodriguez had served as a police officer in the same district for nearly
two decades. Id. at 773-74.
114. Id. at 776 (citing Wright v. Runyon, 2 F.3d 214, 217 (7th Cir. 1993)). The
Rodriguez court concluded, "the fact that Officer Rodriguez may prefer an
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Following Ansonia and citing other precedent, the Seventh
Circuit reemphasized that Title VII "reasonable accommodation" does
not amount to "satisfaction of an employee's every desire," 15 and that
where an employer has offered one reasonable accommodation, the
employer "need not further show that each of the employee's alternative
accommodations would result in undue hardship.""' Furthermore, the
Court stressed that "determination of whether an accommodation is
reasonable in a particular case must be made in the context of the unique
facts and circumstances of that case."
'"17
In a concurring opinion, Judge Posner went even further,
discussing in detail the fact that the public nature of a police officer's
work sets it apart regarding the reasonable accommodation of
employees' religious beliefs. In his view,
.. . [P]olice officers and firefighters have no right
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to
recuse themselves from having to protect persons of
whose activities they disapprove for religious (or
any other) reasons .... The objection to recusal [by
public safety officers] is not the [employer's]
inconvenience . . . [but] to the loss of public
confidence in governmental protective services if the
accommodation that allows him to remain in the 14th District does not render a
transfer 'unreasonable."' Id.
115. Id. at 777 (quoting Wright, 2 F.3d at 217.).
116. Id. (citing Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68 (1968)).
Where there is more than one reasonable accommodation
that would not pose an undue hardship, the employer is not
obliged to provide the accommodation preferred by the
employee. However, the employer's proposed
accommodation will not be 'reasonable' if a more favorable
accommodation is provided to other employees for non-
religious purposes, or, for example, if it requires the
employee to accept a reduction in pay rate or some other loss
of a benefit or privilege of employment and there is an
alternative accommodation that does not do so.
EEOC Directive Transmittal No. 915.003, supra note 4, at 52-53.
117. Rodriguez, 156 F.3d at 776.
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public knows that its protectors are at liberty to pick
and choose whom to protect.
1 18
Posner encouraged other courts to recognize religious neutrality
as a component indispensable in the effective provision and
administration of public services.
As the Rodriguez court indicated, there is little practicality in a
statutorily-prescribed, one-size-fits-all definition of "reasonable
accommodation." Whether a given accommodation will be found
reasonable is a determination to be made in light of the circumstances of
a case. Yet the WRFA flouts Ansonia's explicit holding, followed in
Rodriguez, that an employer need only offer one acceptable means of
accommodation, without obligation to cater to an employee's preferred
alternative. Officer Rodriguez had spent his entire career in the same
district and in the process had grown attached to it. When he began to
feel strongly that his official assignments were irreconcilable with his
religious beliefs, he had the option of transferring to another district
118. Id. at 779 (Posner, J., concurring). Judge Posner continued,
The public knows that its protectors have a private agenda;
everyone does. But it would like to think that they leave that
agenda at home when they are on duty-that Jewish
policemen protect neo-Nazi demonstrators, that Roman
Catholic policemen protect abortion clinics, that Black
Muslim policemen protect Christians and Jews, that
fundamentalist Christian policemen protect noisy atheists
and white-hating Rastafarians, that Mormon policemen
protect Scientologists, and that Greek-Orthodox policemen
of Serbian ethnicity protect Roman Catholic Croats .... The
importance of public confidence in the neutrality of its
protectors is so great that a police department or fire
department or equivalent public-safety agency that decides
not to allow recusal by its employees should be able to plead
'undue hardship' and thus escape any duty of
accommodation .... When the business of the employer is
to protect the public safety, the maintenance of public
confidence in the neutrality of the protectors is central to
effective performance, and the erosion of that confidence by
recognition of a right of recusal by public safety officers so
undermines the agency's effective performance as to
constitute undue hardship within the meaning of the statute.
Id. at 779-80.
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where no abortion clinics were located. Instead, he felt entitled to stay in
his own district and dictate others' shift assignment scheduling around
his own abstention. This result hardly seems reasonable; but under the
WRFA, "for an accommodation to be considered reasonable, the
accommodation shall remove the conflict between employment
requirements and the religious observance or practice of the
employee."'1 9 This could supplant the more flexible Ansonia rule by
placing the onus upon employers to do whatever necessary to "remove
the conflict"-even if that means satisfying an employee's personal
preference in terms of accommodation. As Professor Helen Norton has
indicated:
[T]he holdings in cases under current law involving
conflicts with third parties' civil and reproductive
rights frequently rest on courts' conclusion that an
employer's accommodation need not completely
remove the conflict with the employee's religious
beliefs to be considered reasonable. Indeed, in many
of these cases, the only way truly to remove the
conflict with the employee's sincerely-held religious
beliefs is for the employer to stop providing certain
health care services that the employee finds
inconsistent with his faith or for the employer to
permit the employee to engage in religiously-
compelled witnessing or proselytizing activities
regardless of the effect on others' beliefs or the
employer's antidiscrimination policies. Again,
without clarification, this change in the law [wrought
by the WRFA] may well result in different outcomes
in cases involving conflicts with other workers' civil
rights or patients' important health care needs.
120
The Ansonia rule, that an employer is not required to indulge an
employee's choice among a number of alternatives, is critical for public
and private employers alike. Public employers, however, are even more
constrained in their ability to accommodate employee religious
119. Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2007, H.R. 1431, supra note 1.
120. Testimony of Professor Helen Norton, supra note 65 at 6-7.
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expression or belief as a result of the number of competing interests and
the narrow constitutional mandates they must balance. 12  The WRFA
proposes a watertight rule of strict accommodation that simply cannot
meet these needs.
3. Quental v. Connecticut Commission on the
Deaf and Hearing Impaired
In Quental v. Connecticut Commission on the Deaf and Hearing
Impaired,122 a U.S. district court again granted summary judgment in
favor of a public employer challenged by a state employee. There,
plaintiff Nicole Quental worked as an interpreter for a state agency ("the
Commission") that provided interpreting services for deaf and hearing
impaired clients, some of whom also had mental health disabilities.1
Pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement that governed Quental's
employment with the Commission, Quental took and passed an
examination on the national Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf Code ofE.124
Ethics. In part, the code of ethics explicitly stipulated that in providing
such services, an interpreter was not to "counsel, advise or interject
personal opinions," and further that "the interpreter/transliterator's only
function is to facilitate communication."12 Nonetheless, in at least two
instances, Quental discussed her personal religious beliefs with clients
while on interpreting assignments. Both clients, one of whom suffered
from mental illness which may have involved especially negative
associations with religion, 126 later complained. Quental received a letter
of reprimand 127 from the Commission and subsequently filed suit.
121. See Newman v. City of East Point, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1374, 1379, 1380
(citing Adler v. Duvel County Sch. Bd., 250 F.3d 1330, 1336 (lth Cir. 2001))
("'[W]hether a government activity violates the Establishment Clause is in large part
a legal question to be answered on the basis of judicial interpretation of social facts.
... Every government practice must be judged in its unique circumstances."').
122. 122 F. Supp. 2d 133 (D. Conn. 2000).
123. Id. at 136.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. In one instance, during a break in an interpreting session, Quental talked
with a client about smoking. She told the client that she had smoked at one time but
that "the Lord delivered her from smoking" and proceeded to verbally pray for the
2009] 403
404 FIRST AMENDMENT LA W RE VIEW [Vol. 7
In granting summary judgment for the defendants, the Quental
court emphasized Quental's precarious position, as a state employee,
when interacting with clients. Citing other precedent, the court observed
that "government inculcation of religious beliefs has the impermissible
effect of advancing religion,"12 8 that "[t]he Establishment Clause, at the
very least, prohibits government from appearing to take a position on
questions of religious belief . .. ,,129 and that government efforts 130 to
avoid Establishment Clause violations do not necessarily require that a
government employer demonstrate the conduct it forbids would
"inevitably ... violate the Establishment Clause . .,,13 As in Spratt,
client in his presence. The client complained the following day. Id. at 137. In the
second instance, during an interpreting assignment on behalf of the Commission at
the University of Connecticut Health Center, when a mental health client confided in
Quental about suffering past sexual abuse, Quental responded by sharing Quental's
own personal religious beliefs and giving the client certain religious reading
materials that bore the address of a First Assembly of God church. It was after this
latter assignment that a representative of the Connecticut Mental Health Association
contacted the Commission to inform them that the mental health patient had found
Quental's discussion of religion very upsetting. Id.
127. The letter stipulated that Quental was "free to hold [her] religious beliefs
and live by [her] religious convictions, [but that] during the time [she was] being
paid by the State of Connecticut to provide interpreting services, [she] should not
promote [her] religious beliefs." Id. at 137. Further, the letter noted that the
Commission appreciated the depth and importance of Quental's beliefs, and that it
was willing to make scheduling adjustments as needed to accommodate any
religious activities Quental might undertake outside her capacity as an interpreter. Id.
Finally, it stated that any further incidences of the objectionable behavior would
render Quental subject to disciplinary action, including possible dismissal. Id.
128. Id. at 139 (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 223 (1997)).
129. Id. (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592-94
(1989)).
130. Id. at 140
131. Id. (quoting Marchi v. Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 173 F.3d. 469, 476 (2d
Cir. 1999)). "When government endeavors to police itself and its employees in an
effort to avoid transgressing the Establishment Clause, it must be accorded some
leeway, even though the conduct it forbids might not inevitably be determined to
violate the Establishment Clause and the limitations it imposes might restrict an
individual's conduct that might well be protected by the Free Exercise Clause if the
individual were not acting as an agent of government." Id.
the Quental court held that a merely potential, though unrealized,
Establishment Clause violation justified certain government restrictions
on employee conduct while acting within the scope of employment.
32
Quental was a state employee who engaged with the public in the course
of her interpreting duties. This alone gave rise to "a risk that at least
some of these clients ... could confuse Quental's statements concerning
her religious beliefs and distribution of religious tracts . .. as the
Commission's endorsement of religion . . . .""' The Commission had
reasonably accommodated Quental's religious beliefs by recognizing
them as deeply-held and important, by offering to adjust Quental's work
schedule to allow for private religious practices, and by prohibiting
Quental's religious expression only in the context of providing
interpreting services to clients. 134  It would have resulted in undue
hardship for the Commission had it allowed Quental to promote her
religious beliefs to clients.
135
4. Knight v. State of Connecticut Department of Health
Quental appealed the decision to the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, in tandem with an appeal by Jo Ann Knight.136 Knight was a
Nurse Consultant for the Connecticut Department of Public Health ("the
Department") whose professional responsibilities included overseeing
the provision of home health care by various Medicare agencies. One
aspect of this was interviewing individual patients in their homes.
Knight, a self-described born-again Christian, had conducted an
132. "[T]he Establishment Clause, at the very least, prohibits the government
from appearing to take a position on questions of religious belief or from making
adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political
community." County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 594 (1989) (quoting
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
133. Quental, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 140.
134. Id. at 142.
135. In addition to the risk that clients might interpret Quental's religious
beliefs as Commission-endorsed, allowing Quental to proselytize clients would have
violated the national code of ethics by which defendant-appellee was bound. Id.
136. Knight v. State of Conn. Dept. of Health, Civil Action No.
3:97CV2114(DJS), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21120 at *1-22 (D. Conn. Feb. 22, 2000)
(denying plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and granting defendant's motion
for summary judgment), affid 275 F.3d 156 (2nd Cir. 2001).
20091 BRING YOUR DOGMA TO WORK 405
FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW
interview at the home of a homosexual couple. One partner was dying
from AIDS. She testified that during this interview session, she felt
overcome by the Holy Spirit to share her beliefs about salvation with the
clients. During part of the conversation, Knight informed the couple that
"[God] doesn't like the homosexual lifestyle" and it was alleged at the
lower court trial that Knight insinuated to her clients "that their lifestyle
would condemn them 'to hell."",137 As a result of this incident, Knight
was suspended by the Department for four weeks (subsequently reduced
to two weeks) without pay.
In dismissing Knight's Title VII claims, the district court, citing
Hardison, held that under the Act, "[a] reasonable accommodation does
not include the accommodation which is 'most beneficial' to the
employee, but rather 'an acceptable reconciliation of the needs of the
employee's religion and the exigencies of the employer's business.""
38
.The court further held that the defendant had reasonably accommodated
Knight's religious beliefs, going so far as allowing her to pray during
staff meetings. Permitting Knight to "evangelize to a patient population
that includes persons of alternate life styles and differing religious
beliefs,"'13 9 however, would have placed an undue hardship on the state
hospital because it would inevitably offend some patients and possibly
subject Knight's employers to further legal liability. 4 ' The duty of
reasonable accommodation did not implicitly include allowing an
employee to impose religious beliefs on others.'
4'
137. Id. at *3.
138. Id. at *13-14 (quoting Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S.
63, 69 (1977)). Note that while the WRFA appears to focus exclusively on financial
aspects of a business upon which a religious accommodation may come to bear, the
"exigencies of the [public] employer's business" is largely a constitutional inquiry.
Id.
139. Id. at *14.
140. See Marianne C. Delpo, Never on Sunday: Workplace Religious Freedom
in the New Millenium, 51 ME. L. REv. 341, 349 (1999) ("[A]ccommodation of
proselytizing employee's religious practice of preaching or attempting to convert-
in addition to whatever direct costs this may entail-risks claims of harassment by
other employees. As indicated by the Eighth Circuit, this risk may itself constitute
an undue hardship.") (citing Wilson v. U.S. West Communications, Inc., 58 F.3d
1337, 1339 (8th Cir. 1995))).
141. Knight, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21120 at *14-15 (citing Chalmers v.
Tulon Co. of Richmond, 101 F.3d 1012, 1021 (4th Cir. 1996)).
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With Quental, Knight brought her case before the Second
Circuit. 42  Both appellants challenged the lower courts' grants of
summary judgment in favor of their respective state employers. In
affirming both district court judgments, the Second Circuit focused on
appellants' Title VII claims that their state employers had failed to
reasonably accommodate their religious beliefs. As an initial matter,
neither Quental nor Knight had established prima facie religious
discrimination.143 Beyond this, the Court concluded that the public
employers had reasonably accommodated the plaintiffs' religious beliefs
because the restrictions on their religious expressions applied only while
conducting state business and interacting with clients. 44  Most
significantly, even assuming plaintiffs' had made out prima facie cases
of religious discrimination, and that the state had not reasonably
accommodated their religious beliefs, the Second Circuit held that "the
accommodation [plaintiffs sought was] not reasonable. Permitting
appellants to evangelize while providing services to clients would
jeopardize the state's ability to provide services in a religion-neutral
matter."'' 45 The state thus could not have accommodated plaintiffs' need
to proselytize clients on state assignments without incurring undue
hardship.
The WRFA does not contemplate public employers' duty to
provide religion-neutral services, though both Quental and Knight found
that accommodating either plaintiffs religious practices would have
142. Knight v. Conn. Dept. of Pub. Health in tandem with Quental v. Conn.
Comm'n on the Deaf, 275 F.3d 156 (2nd. Cir. 2001).
143. To establish prima facie religious discrimination, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that "(1) they held a bona fide religious belief conflicting with an
employment requirement; (2) they informed their employers of this belief; and (3)
they were disciplined for failure to comply with the conflicting employment
requirement." Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 757 F.2d 476, 481 (1985). In the
instant case, the Second Circuit opined, neither Quental nor Knight requested any
accommodation of their need to evangelize clients: "Knowledge that [appellants]
are born-again Christians is insufficient to put their employers on notice of their
need to evangelize their clients. To hold otherwise would place a heavy burden on
employers, making them responsible for being aware of every aspect of every
employees' religion which could require an accommodation." Knight and Quental,
275 F.3d at 168.
144. Knight and Quental, 275 F.3d at 168.
145. Id.
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resulted in undue hardship for their public employers. The WRFA offers
an attenuated definition of "undue hardship" as an accommodation
44,,146"requiring significant difficulty or expense. It goes on to enumerate
three factors147 to take into account when considering whether a given
accommodation entails significant difficulty or expense. Each of those
factors addresses exclusively financial burdens on an employer. This
emphasis is misplaced in the context of public employers seeking to
avoid excessive entanglement between their public services and the
religious beliefs of the employees who carry out those services.1
48
Indeed, neither Quental nor Knight concerned fiscal costs related to the
defendant employers' decisions. The mere possibility of a public entity
sending conflicting messages to clients was sufficient to establish the
employers' legitimate interests in restricting the employees' religious
expression and in ultimately taking disciplinary or termination actions.
Financial costs in the public employment context were addressed largely
only in relation to the possibility of future litigation for Establishment
Clause violations. The WRFA thus misses this point in framing "undue
hardship" as a solely pecuniary analysis.
1 49
146. H.R. 1431, 110th Cong., §2(a)(3) (2007).
147. Those factors are "the identifiable cost of the accommodation, including
the costs of loss of productivity and of retraining or hiring employees or transferring
employees from one facility to another; the overall financial resources and size of
the employer involved, relative to the number of its employees; and, for an employer
with multiple facilities, the geographic separateness or administrative or fiscal
relationship of the facilities." H.R. 1431, 110th Cong., § 2(a)(3)(A)-(C) (2007).
148. Many legal scholars have noted that while the language of WRFA is
modeled after an entirely different employment law, the Americans with Disabilities
Act, those ADA terms and standards are ill-equipped to address religious
accommodation issues: "WRFA's adoption of the ADA's economic standard of
'undue hardship' is a prime example. WRFA's definition of 'undue hardship' only
permits an employer to deny an accommodation request if it can show it would incur
'identifiable increased costs.' This standard provides an employer little guidance.
Whereas accommodations under the ADA generally involve architectural alterations
or equipment purchases with identifiable costs, accommodations for religious
practices have consequences that often cannot be so easily quantified ... WRFA's
'undue hardship' standard does not contemplate this inability to weigh such pertinent
factors and employers will face inevitable confusion in trying to apply the standard."
Testimony of Michael J. Gray, supra note 2, at 6-7. See also Sonne, supra note 28,
at 1051-59 (discussing the practical implications of WRFA's Disability Model).
149. See supra note 143.
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5. Berry v. Department of Social Services
Finally, in an even more recent decision, the Ninth Circuit
upheld summary judgment for an employer, a county Department of
Social Services ("the Department"), on a Title VII claim instituted by
Daniel Berry.1 50  Berry, an evangelical Christian, worked for the
Department's employment services division, where he conducted
frequent interviews with unemployed and underemployed clients to assist
in their transition out of welfare programs.1 51  The Department
maintained a policy, 52 of which Berry was made aware, that employees
were not permitted to discuss religion with clients or other persons in the
scope of their employment.153 While Berry had the option of conducting
client interviews outside his office cubicle, he chose to carry out over
ninety percent of his client exchanges there.154  On more than one
occasion, Berry was reprimanded by supervisors for displaying religious
messages in his cubicle and placing a Bible visibly on his desk while
interviewing clients.155  In affirming summary judgment for the
Department, the Ninth Circuit stressed the importance of a balancing
approach, citing the test first delineated in Pickering v. Board of
Education:
56
150. Berry v. Dept. of Social Servs., 447 F.3d 642 (2006).
151. Id. at 646.
152. The Supreme Court makes clear that the government or a governmental
entity need not demonstrate a compelling interest in maintaining a law or policy of
neutrality and general applicability, even if the burden to religion is substantial. See
Christian Legal Soc'y v. Kane, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27347, *79 (N.D. Cal., Apr.
17, 2006) (citing San Jose Christian College v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024,
1030 (9th Cir. 2004)).
153. Berry, 447 F.3d at 646.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 647.
156. Id. at 648-649. Pickering, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). In Pickering, a public
school teacher was dismissed after writing a letter to the editor that criticized the
board of education and other school administrators. The Court held that, absent any
evidence the letter contained false statements, the teacher's speech was protected by
the First Amendment because it touched on a matter of public concern and the
teacher exercised his right to free speech in his capacity as a citizen taxpayer rather
than as a public school teacher. In its analysis, the Court noted that "[t]he problem in
20091 409
Mr. Berry, of course, is entitled to seek the greatest
latitude possible for expressing his religious beliefs
at work. The Department, however, must run the
gauntlet of either being sued for not respecting an
employee's rights.., or being sued for violating the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by
appearing to endorse its employee's religious
expression.157
Berry was not prohibited from discussing his religious beliefs
with co-workers or displaying religious messages, praying, or reading the
Bible in his cubicle when he alone occupied that space.
Rather, Berry was not permitted to undertake these activities in
the presence of his clients. The Court pointed out that the "Department's
clients seek assistance from Mr. Berry in his capacity as an agent of the
state .... It follows that any discussion by Mr. Berry of his religion runs,. - ,,158
a real danger of entangling the Department with religion. The
Department had a legitimate interest in restricting Berry's religious
displays or expressions to clients to avoid giving any impression of
government endorsement of those religious messages, which clients
might otherwise reasonably infer. 159 Addressing the question of undue
hardship, the Court acknowledged that without any statutory definition in
Title VII, courts have interpreted this element on case-by-case bases.
6
0
Significantly, the Court went on to say that in this instance, it was not
necessary to quibble over "the outer limits of 'undue hardship' because
[t]he Department has clearly demonstrated that it
cannot accommodate either Mr. Berry's desire to
discuss religion with the Department's clients or his
preference for displaying religious items in his
cubicle [during client interviews]. As we have
any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees." Id. at 568.
157. Berry, 447 F.3d at 650.
158. Id. at 650-51.
159. Id. at 651.
160. Id. at 655.
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noted, allowing Mr. Berry to discuss religion with
the Department's clients would create a danger of
violations of the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. This constitutes an undue hardship.'
6 1
In its conclusion, the Berry Court reiterated that "[p]ublic
employers such as the Department face the difficult task of charting a
course between infringing on employees' rights to the free exercise of
their religions ... and violating the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment by appearing to endorse their employees' religious
,,162 63expressions. A balancing test, like that in Pickering,' was best
suited to resolve "these sometimes conflicting constitutional rights by
recognizing the legitimacy of the interests asserted by both sides [and




As these cases illustrate, courts have developed a solid body of
Title VII case law articulating flexible reasonable accommodation and
undue hardship standards in the public employment sphere. In that
context, religious discrimination claims have generally been decided in
favor of public employers where accommodation would risk excessive
entanglement. The Lemon test, including its third prong proscribing
excessive church-state entanglement, remains a critical and viable
standard in assessing the constitutionality of government actions
intermingling with religion.165 The proposed WRFA fails to account for
the particular sensitivity of public employers' obligation to avoid any
actual or apparent government endorsement of religious practices or
beliefs when accommodating employees' right to free religious
161. Id.
162. Id. at 657.
163. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
164. Berry, 447 F.3d at 657.
165. See Vasquez v. L.A. County, 487 F.3d 1246, 1254 (9th Cir. 2007). See
also Newman v. City of East Point, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1374, 1378 (N.D. Ga. 2002)
(The Lemon three-part test "remains, with one notable exception, the controlling
standard for Establishment Clause jurisprudence.").
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expression in the public workplace. Obviously, WRFA passage would
not subordinate or supersede the heightened scrutiny accorded in the
courts to First Amendment claims, and it may not wholly preclude courts
from continuing to employ necessary flexibility in Title VII claims
against public employers. Still, it is not clear that this area of
jurisprudence would escape the WRFA unscathed. The Act's provisions
would certainly place a greater burden of accommodation on employers,
to the decided advantage of religious employees. As civil rights attorney
Michael J. Gray testified before a U.S. House of Representatives
subcommittee,
[i]f enacted, WRFA's more rigid accommodation
standards would leave many employers without
flexibility to protect appropriate religious expression
of the requesting party as well as the religious
beliefs of other employees. The Act arguably may
create an environment ripe for reverse religious
discrimination which, even if constitutional, is-• 166
hardly a desired result for any interested parties.
Moreover, the proposed amendment runs the risk of repealing
the Ansonia16 7 rule. In its effort to define core statutory concepts, the
WRFA belies the reality that in most instances of alleged employer-
employee Title VII discrimination, the specific facts of a case will be
outcome determinative. This restricts employers' and courts' ability to
pursue more flexible totality-of-the-circumstances analyses. Most
worrisome is that there is nothing to suggest public employers will be
immunized from possible fallout despite their good-faith efforts to
comply.
The WRFA would amend Title VII by adding that to be
considered reasonable an employer's accommodation "shall remove the
conflict between employment requirements and the religious observances
or practice of the employee. 1 68 This promises to eviscerate the meaning
of "reasonable," and supplant it with a standard of absolute
accommodation. At the highly sensitive crossroads of public
employment and the Establishment Clause, this standard will simply not
166. Testimony of Michael J. Gray, supra note 2 at 9.
167. 479 U.S. 60 (1986).
168. H.R. 1431, 110th Cong., § 2(b)(2) (2007).
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be uniformly achievable.' 69  Consider the gridlock instance where a
public employer has accommodated an employee's religious practices or
beliefs to an extent reasonable under the circumstances170 but the
employee insists he or she either be permitted to continue the
objectionable religious behavior or be provided with a preferred
alternative. In either instance, the public employer's constitutional duty
to avoid excessive entanglement will render it impossible to "remove the
conflict," other than by disciplining or dismissing such employee.
171
Under the WRFA, however, those actions may be considered insufficient
reasonable accommodation and subject the employer to liability.
The WRFA seeks to expand the current statutory definition of
"employee" 171 to include one "who, with or without reasonable
169. See Gawlik, supra note 31, at 264 ("the accommodation of 'mutual'
compromise-one not always requiring complete removal to the extent that the
employee is burden free-is the concept that the [Supreme] Court prefers.").
170. An employer may be subject to and bound by a collective bargaining
agreement or seniority system which it is not required to violate for the purpose of
accommodating an employees' religious practices. Other binding circumstances may
exist as well. In Quental, the Connecticut Commission on the Deaf and Hearing
Impaired adhered to a national code of ethics, of which the plaintiff was aware and
by which she had agreed to be bound; the Commission was not required to violate
these national standards in order to accommodate Quental's religious practices while
on interpreting assignments. 122 F. Supp. 2d 133, 136.
171. In Spratt, for example, the sheriff employer maintained that
accommodating was not possible in plaintiffs case because the sheriff felt he was
compelled by law not to allow religious counseling by a county social worker. 621 F.
Supp. 594, 598 (W.D. Mich. 1985). The sheriff "did not ask plaintiff to shed his
Christian beliefs when he came to work, but he did ask him to leave them out of his
counseling." Id. The court agreed: "Considering the facts of this case and the
constitutional law in the area of religious practice in public institutions, Sheriff
Heffron had very limited flexibility with which to accommodate plaintiffs religious
practices." Id. at 600.
172. The term 'employee' means an individual employed by an
employer, except that the term 'employee' shall not include
any person elected to public office in any State or political
subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or
any person chosen by such officer to be on such officer's
personal staff, or an appointee on the policy making level or
an immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the
constitutional or legal powers of the office. The exemption
set forth in the preceding sentence shall not include
employees subject to the civil service laws of a State
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accommodation, is qualified to perform the essential functions of the
employment that such individual holds or desires." 173 The "essential
functions" of any job will vary in every instance depending on the type
of work involved, and such vague language is not instructive for
employers or courts. 114 It is of utmost importance that public employers
in particular have some concrete idea of their constitutional duties in this
area in order to act accordingly and not be penalized for their good faith
efforts to comply, since difficult decisions will remain discretionary.
The cases above did not concern the public employees' literal
competence to perform the jobs for which they had been hired. Robert
Spratt, the prison therapist, had obtained a Bachelor of Science Degree
and a Masters Degree in Social Sciences from Michigan State
University.1 75 Angelo Rodriguez had served as an officer for the city of
Chicago for nearly two decades at the time he filed his Title VII suit
against the Chicago Police Department. 176 Nicole Quental passed a
national examination on the ethical obligations expected in providing
interpreting services to the deaf.177 There is little question that each of
these individuals' possessed the ability to "perform the essential
functions" their jobs required. Instead, they were unable to do so without
injecting personal religious beliefs into their public work, in ways that
implicated actual or perceived government endorsement of religion.
The case law on reasonable accommodation under Title VII has
been clear that to achieve the requisite accommodation an employer is
not obligated to adopt employees' mere personal preferences. This
guideline is especially crucial for public employers who face
Establishment Clause duties of great consequence even as they attempt to
respect religious employees' Title VII rights. While public employment
per se does not amount to the forfeiture of First Amendment or Title VII
government, governmental agency or political subdivision.
With respect to employment in a foreign country, such term
includes an individual who is a citizen of the United States.
42 U.S.C. §2000e(f) (2004).
173. H.R. 1431, 11 0th Cong., § 2(a)(2)(A) (2007).
174. See supra note 59.
175. Spratt, 621 F. Supp. at 596.
176. Rodriguez, 156 F.3d 771, 773-74 (7th Cir. 1998).
177. Quental, 122 F. Supp. 2d 133, 136 (D. Conn. 2000).
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rights or protections," 8 a public employee acting pursuant to official
duties is not insulated from employer restraints or disciplinary measures
that may be otherwise unconstitutional.179  In accepting public
employment, an employee implicitly abdicates those rights to some
degree while acting within the scope of employment (though certainly
not as a private citizen). The compelling interest of avoiding
entanglement leaves public employers with fewer options in
accommodating employees' religious practices and beliefs in the
workplace.
This is not to say public employers have no options whatsoever.
Whether reasonable accommodation is possible will depend largely on
considerable breadth and flexibility in public employer discretion
standards. The goals of compromise and balance in the public workplace
are more likely attainable if such standards remain workable. Greater
flexibility sheds light on blatant abuses by employers, on the one hand,
and unreasonable employee expectations on the other. Contrarily, the
WRFA's unyielding definitions of "reasonable accommodation," undue
hardship," and even "employee" promise less flexibility than ever for
employers-public or private. Courts have tended to grant public
employers sizeable latitude when presented with excessive entanglement
defenses, often where only a possible misperception by the public is at
stake. In this respect, the pro-employee WRFA could actually have the
perverse effect of disfavoring public employees or eliminating any
religious expression from the public workplace whatsoever. It may
prompt public employers to become more wary in hiring practices or to
adopt more restrictive, uniform workplace religious policies to avoid
employee assertions of Title VII entitlement to a preferred
accommodation. If a public employer knows it will not be able to
remove a conflict between an employee's job requirements and that
employee's religious practices altogether, the employer may be
disinclined to extend employment in the first place. In turn, it may be
more difficult for an employee to prove a Title VII claim for
178. See Morgenstern v. County of Nassau, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91746, 39
(E.D.N.Y. 2008) (Acknowledging that "a public employee does not forfeit First
Amendment rights in exchange for a paycheck.").
179. See Marchi v. Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 173 F.3d 469, 476 (2d Cir.
1999).
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discriminatory hiring practices than for wrongful termination. Whatever
the outcome, it seems apparent the WRFA would restrict the public
employer's already limited ability to promote free religious expression,
as far as the Constitution permits, in the public workplace.
James Standish, the executive director of the North American
Religious Liberty Association,180 is a prominent Seventh-Day Adventist
and outspoken WRFA proponent.18 1 In the Act's defense, Standish has
written:
[T]he courts may well find.., the WRFA does not
justify the refusal of essential personnel, like police
officers or fire fighters, to protect individuals or
entities with whom they have moral differences. But,
even to the extent that a court may find that a task-
based accommodation is in order in a particular case,
such accommodation could not, by any stretch, be
required if it meant that the services in question were
no longer available to the public. Otherwise, the
employer would patently be faced with an undue
hardship.
181
Standish's argument, like the WRFA itself, does not comport
with the proactive Establishment Clause mandates with which public
employers must comply. Standish likewise promotes an absolutist
understanding of "reasonable accommodation" even in directly
addressing public protection services. He makes an exception only
where "the services in question were no longer available to the
public."' 83 The Quental facts reveal the inadequacy of this argument.
Quental's religious beliefs did not render her interpreting services "no
longer available." Rather, she insisted on injecting her beliefs in the
course of providing those services. As a representative of a public
180. North American Religious Liberty Association, http://religiousliberty.
info/index.php.
181. See Testimony of James Standish before the United States House of
Representatives, Feb. 12, 2008, available at http://www.religiousliberty.info/site
/l/docs/WRFATestimony-Feb08-Standish.pdf. During this testimony, Standish
expounded WRFA virtues.
182. Richard T. Foltin and James D. Standish, Reconciling Faith and
Livelihood: Religion in the Workplace and Title VII, 31 Hum. Rts. 19 (2004).
183. Id.
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agency, Quental's proselytizing was clearly outside the scope of her
employment. 184 More damning is the well-established preeminence of
Establishment Clause strictures over conflicting statutory requirements.
Standish appears to expect the WRFA would reach public employers and
employees to some extent. There is little room, however, for imposing
such heightened religious accommodation burdens upon public
employers who must first and foremost repel excessive entanglement,
real or perceived. The schizophrenic result under the WRFA could thus
be one that thwarts public employer openness, even as it raises religious
employees' expectations of accommodation and threatens to afford
favorable protection that could come only at the disadvantage of other
employees or the broader public.
PART VI. CONCLUSION
It appears the WRFA's pragmatic flaws have not gone unnoted
in Congress. As this article was being written, in late September 2008,
Senator John Kerry introduced the Workplace Religious Freedom Act
1852008 -a bill bearing little more than titular resemblance to its
184. See, e.g., Lee v. York County Sch. Div., 418 F. Supp. 2d. 816, 829 (E.D.
Va. 2006) (A public school teacher's First Amendment rights were not violated
when religious messages he posted on his classroom walls were taken down, because
the messages were not protected expression. In reaching this conclusion, the district
court noted, "As a public school teacher, Lee used these materials to help perform
his job and teach his students... [He did not] choose a private channel in which to
express his views . . . [and] [flurthermore, the intended audience was only his
students-the very individuals around whom his employment duties revolve...
185. The text of S. 3628, 110th Cong. (2008) in its entirety is as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives
of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE
This Act may be cited as the 'Workplace Religious Freedom
Act of 2008'.
SECTION 2. AMENDMENTS
(a) Definitions-Section 701 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(42 U.S.C. 2000e) is amended-
(1) in subsection (j)--
(A) by inserting '(1)' after '(j)'; and
(B) by adding at the end the following:
20091
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(2) For purposes of paragraph (1), the practice of wearing
religious clothing or a religious hairstyle, or of taking time
off for a religious reason, imposes an undue hardship on the
conduct of the employer's business in accommodating such
practice only if the accommodation imposes a significant
difficulty or expense on the conduct of the employer's
business when considered in light of factors set forth in
section 101(10)(B) of the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 (42 U.S.C. 12111 (10)(B)).'; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
'(o)(l) The term 'taking time off for a religious reason'
means taking time off for a holy day or to participate in a
religious observance.
'(2) The term 'wearing religious clothing or a religious
hairstyle' means-
'(A) wearing religious apparel (as defined in section 774 of
title 10, United States Code);
'(B) wearing jewelry or other ornament as a religious
practice or an expression of religious belief;
'(C) carrying a symbolic object as required by religious
observance; or
'(D) adopting the presence, absence, or style of a person's
hair or beard as a religious practice or an expression of
religious belief.'.
SECTION 3. EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICATION OF AMENDMENTS;
SEVERABILITY.
(a) Effective Date-Except as provided in subsection (b),
this Act and the amendments made by section 2 take effect
on the date of enactment of this Act.
(b) Application of Amendments-This Act and the
amendments made by section 2 do not apply with respect to
conduct occurring before the date of enactment of this Act.
(c) Severability-
(1) IN GENERAL-If any provision of an amendment made by
this Act, or any application of such provision to any person
or circumstance, is held to be unconstitutional, the remainder
of the amendments made by this Act and the application of
the provision to any other person or circumstance shall not
be affected.
(2) DEFINITION OF RELIGION-If, in the course of determining
a claim brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.), a court holds that the
application of the provision described in paragraph (1) to a
person or circumstance is unconstitutional, the court shall
BRING YOUR DOGMA TO WORK
S 186predecessors. While the relative merits of that bill are outside the
scope of this article, certain conspicuous omissions are worth pointing
out. First, WRFA 2008 makes no attempt to provide a statutory
definition for the terms "employee," "perform the essential functions," or
"undue hardship." It dispenses with the notion of a "temporary or
tangential impact on the ability to perform job functions." Second, gone
is the WRFA 2007 stipulation that "to be considered to be reasonable,
[an] accommodation shall remove the conflict between employment
requirements and the religious observance or practice of the
employee."187  The WRFA 2008 instead identifies two practices-
wearing religious clothing or hairstyles, and taking time off for a
religious reason-as ones that will amount to undue hardship only if they
impose significant difficulty or expense, a determination the WRFA
2008 indicates is still to be modeled after the ADA. It goes on to define• 188
the meanings of those two practices. If nothing else, the WRFA 2008
suggests some concession that the WRFA measures proposed throughout
the past 15 years were ill-suited for clarifying religious employer rights
law. To be sure, the "overarching goal of amending Title VII to provide
greater protections for workers' religious practices" is commendable.'
8 9
That protection, however, must not subordinate the civil rights of fellow
employees or the public at large, and in the public sector, it cannot evade
determine the claim with respect to that person or
circumstance by applying the definition of the term 'religion'
specified in section 701 of that Act (42 U.S.C. 2000e), as in
effect on the day before the date of enactment of this Act.
186. Senator Kerry introduced or co-sponsored prior versions of the WRFA at
least five times: S. 2071, 104th Cong. (1996); S. 92 and S. 1124, 105th Cong.
(1997); S. 1668, 106th Cong. (1999); S. 2572, 107th Cong. (2002); and S. 677,
109th Cong. (2005) (the latter being the only of the preceding bills Mr. Kerry did not
introduce, but co-sponsored). That Senator Kerry, in particular, introduced the
WRFA 2008 perhaps tends to render its substantive overhaul especially telling.
187. H.R. 1431, 110th Cong., §2(b)(2) (2007).
188. A press release from Senator Rick Santorum's office, on the day the
WRFA 2005 was introduced in the Senate, read, "If passed, this legislation will
require employers to make reasonable accommodations for an employee's religious
practice or observance, such as time off and attire," indicating these may have been
the main issues the WRFA was intended to address all along.
http://churchstate.org/article.php?id=36 (last accessed Feb. 13, 2009).
189. See Testimony of Professor Helen Norton, supra note 65, at 1.
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government's Establishment Clause obligations. Any amendment to
Title VII addressing religion in the workplace should account for the
heightened constitutional concerns of public employers in seeking a
flexible middle ground for government employees' religious expression
rights, the wider public whom they serve, and the Constitution.
